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THE PROPERTY UNIT AND THE AGGREGATION
OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS UNDER
THE TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1958
I. INTRODUCTION
The migratory nature of oil and gas and the complexities of mod-
ern mineral conveyancing lend confusion to any attempt to define
precisely the property unit for tax purposes. Yet, the depletion al-
lowance granted by statute to the owners of certain oil and gas in-
terests is prescribed by statute to be 272 per cent of gross income
from "the property," and the amount deducted cannot exceed fifty
per cent of the net taxable income from that property.' Similarly,
the statutes refer directly or indirectly to "the property" when pre-
scribing the rules for determining abandonment losses and for com-
puting capital gains or losses upon the sale of oil and gas interests.!
Despite this manifest importance of the term, the pre-1954 codes
contained no definition of "the property" and, as will be seen, the
1954 Code definition was quite unrealistic.
This Comment concerns the effect of a single subsection, inserted
in the 1954 Code by the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,' upon
the definition of an oil and gas "property" and upon the taxpayer's
right to aggregate his separate properties into one tax unit for de-
pletion purposes. The pertinent section of the 1954 Code is section
614,' and the newly inserted subsection is subsection (d). A ma-
jority of the amending sections are outside the scope of this Com-
ment, as they deal with the aggregation of mineral interests other
than oil and gas and specifically except fluid deposits from their ef-
fect.' With respect to oil and gas interests, however, the 1958 act
adds to the 1954 Code the following subsection:
(d) 1939 Code Treatment With Respect to Operating Mineral In-
terests in Case of Oil and Gas Wells-In the case of oil and gas wells,
any taxpayer may treat any property (determined as if the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 continued to apply) as if subsections (a) and
(b) had not been enacted. If any such treatment would constitute
'int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 613(a).
aInt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 167(f), 612, 1011-12, 1231.
aTechnical Amendments Act of 1958, § 37(c), 72 Stat. 1606, 26 U.S.C.A. 726.
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(a), (b).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 614(c), as amended by Technical Amendments Act of
1958, § 37(c), 26 U.S.C.A. 726.
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an aggregation under subsection (b), such treatment shall be taken
into account in applying subsection (b) to other property of the
taxpayer.6
To provide a focal point for this analysis, we assume that a tax-
payer owns three separate oil and gas leases, two of which are quite
profitable, and the third of which is only a marginal producer. It
is apparent that the depletion allowance on the third lease will be
unavailable due to the statutory restriction of the allowance to fifty
per cent of net income. If, however, the taxpayer may combine his
properties as a unit for tax purposes, the averaging of costs and in-
come will result in a substantially greater depletion deduction.' The
taxpayer must therefore determine (1) what "properties" he owns,
(2) his privilege, if any, to aggregate them, and (3) under which
code he will obtain the more favorable tax treatment, since a
literal reading of the 1958 act indicates that he may have an elec-
tion to proceed under either the 1954 or the 1939 Code. This paper
will examine, in order, the definition of "the property" under the
1939 Code, the relationship of aggregation and definition under the
1939 Code, the definition and aggregation of property under the
1954 Code, and the effect of the 1958 amendment.
II. DEFINITION OF "THE PROPERTY" UNDER THE 1939 CODE
Prior to 1954, the various codes contained no definition of "the
property," but a concept of its nature was soon developed by the
Internal Revenue Service. The Service's position was first promul-
gated in 1941 when General Counsel Memorandum No. 22106 con-
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(d), as added by Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
37(c), 26 U.S.C.A. 726.
'Comparison of individual and aggregate methods of depletion computation:
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cluded, "Accordingly, the term property may be defined as each
separate interest owned by the taxpayer in each separate tract or
parcel of land."8 (Emphasis added.) To the two concepts of "sepa-
rate interest" and "separate tract or parcel of land" was added a
third by G.C.M. 24094 in 1944, when it stated that ". . . the term
property should properly be defined as each separate interest owned
by the taxpayer in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or
parcel of land."' (Emphasis added.)
The Service adhered to a mechanical interpretation of these memo-
randa which, when strictly applied to the oil and gas industry, re-
sulted in "the property" becoming the smallest conceivable unit
within an operation. The courts, on the other hand, simply did not
approve a universal application of the General Counsel Memoranda
quoted above.
A majority of the decisions dealing with the definition of property
under the 1939 Code concerned hard minerals. The courts drew no
distinction between hard minerals and fluid deposits for purposes of
definition, and repeatedly referred to hard mineral decisions for
guidance in defining oil and gas properties. A brief review of these
decisions is thus in order, categorized under the factors of "separate
interest," "separate tract or parcel," and "each mineral deposit" con-
tained in the memoranda quoted above.
The factor of "separate interest" was in issue in William H. Cree.'"
The taxpayer had acquired two oil and gas leases. Both before and
after this acquisition, he had purchased various participating inter-
ests, each limited to certain wells drilled upon these leases. In his re-
turn, the taxpayer reported the income from the participating in-
terests as royalties and separately reported the income from the leases
as income from a business or profession. Depletion was claimed on
both interests. The Commissioner argued that the depletion allow-
ance to taxpayer as lessee should be computed as if each lease was a
separate property. The taxpayer contended that the interests he own-
ed in each well should be treated as a separate property, citing G.C.M.
22106 in support of his position. The Board of Tax Appeals held
(1) that the participating interests and the leaseholds merged, and
that (2) the taxpayer owned two separate properties, viz., the two
leases. The Board, in regard to the taxpayer's contention, stated:
The petitioner cites G.C.M. 22106 wherein it is stated, inter alia,
that a single tract or parcel of land may be divided into two or more
s G.C.M. 22106, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 245.
9G.C.M. 24094, 1944 Cum. Bull. 250.
'047 B.T.A. 868 (1942), nonacq., 1943 Cum. Bull. 29.
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separate tracts or parcels by means of conveyances of leases "carving
up the original 'tract or parcel'," and that a taxpayer with several
interests in a tract has several properties therein. But we do not think
the idea soundly applied here, where the whole leasehold is acquired
by one formerly owning only certain limited rights with respect
thereto."
In Herndon Drilling Co. v. Commissioner," the taxpayer owned
an undivided one-half interest in fee in a lease and an oil pay-
ment interest in the remaining undivided one-half interest. Since it
was to the taxpayer's advantage, he treated the properties as separate
and deducted one half of the intangible costs and treated the re-
maining one half as oil payment costs. The Tax Court upheld this
position, stating:
We think that under the facts here, the two interests in each lease
must be held to be two properties, and we so hold. They are inherently
separate and different in character. One is an outright ownership in
fee of an undivided part of the leasehold estate. The other is less than
a fee title interest in the remaining undivided part of the leasehold.
There is no merger of the titles to the two interests. See G.C.M.
24094, 1944 C.B. 250. Cf. Win. H. Cree, 47 B.T.A. 868."
Although the court paid lip service to G.C.M. 24094, the rationale
for the decision lay in the dissimilarity of the interests in issue. Sim-
ilarly, in Helvering v. Jewell Mining Co.," a leasehold interest and
a fractional over-riding royalty interest (retained from a grant to
a sub-lessee) were held inherently different in character, precluding
a merger of interests. The mining operation of the taxpayer and the
sub-lessee were distinct and separate in nature.
Thus, as to the "separate interest" factor, pre-1954 decisions turn-
ed on whether or not the interests were inherently different in char-
acter. If they were, two properties existed; if not, there was a merger
of interests.
The factor of "separate tract of parcel of land" fared somewhat
better in the courts, chiefly because it was early agreed that each
separate well is not a separate property and also because there was
no dispute as to the definition of a "tract" or "parcel."' 5 It was the
issue of what made a tract or parcel separate that gave rise to litiga-
tion.
1 Id. at 872.
,26 T.C. 628 (1946), nonacq., 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 6.
"s Id. at 637.
14126 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1942).
" William H. Cree, 47 B.T.A. 868 (1942), nonacq., 1943 Cum. Bull. 29; Frank Lyons,
1O T.C. 634 (1946).
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In Berkshire Oil Co. v. Commissioner,"6 the property involved con-
sisted of four lots which were acquired simultaneously. Two of these
lots were contiguous; the other two touched at only one common
corner. The instrument of conveyance provided that "for all of the
purposes of this lease, the property above described shall be deemed
to be one single, contiguous, and continuous body or tract of land."
A dry hole was drilled on one of the two contiguous lots. The tax-
payer released to the lessor all rights in the two contiguous lots. In
its tax return, the taxpayer deducted the intangible drilling expenses
and also an amount representing the cash cost applicable to the
acreage surrendered by the release. The Commissioner allowed deduc-
tion only of the drilling costs. It was the taxpayer's theory that each
of the lots constituted a single property and that, therefore, an aban-
donment loss could be claimed upon the disposition of any lot or
lots. The Commissioner, however, contended that there was only
one property, having a unitary basis, and that the loss deduction
could be taken only upon final disposition of the entire lease. The
quoted lease provision was held not to be determinative of the facts
or the law, and each lot was held to be a separate property. The
court cited with approval the following case law of Louisiana: ". . . to
constitute a single tract of land, the lands must be so situated that
one may pass from one part to another without passing over the
lands of another ....
In Black Mountain Corporation,"s the taxpayer acquired two con-
tiguous properties at different times and assigned each of them to
different mines which it already owned and had consistently treated
as separate for tax purposes. The Commissioner contended that the
two mines constituted a single property for depletion purposes. One
mine had been quite profitable; the other had shown a loss. Com-
bining the profit of one and the loss of the other reduced net in-
come and, due to the fifty per cent limitation, the depletion al-
lowance also."9
The taxpayer argued that "the property," as used in the code, meant
the economic and practical unit in which the taxpayer must con-
duct his operations. The court, on the authority of the regulations,
upheld the taxpayer:
We are unable to see the necessity for the commissioner's contention
that every separate acquisition of coal lands must be treated as a
109 T.C. 903 (1947).
17 Ibid.
18 T.C. 1117 (1945), nonacq., 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 6.
19 Thus demonstrating that aggregation is not always to the taxpayer's advantage.
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separate property for the purpose of computing percentage depletion.
Separate acquisitions can, under proper circumstances, be combined
to form one property, and likewise, under proper circumstances, one
acquisition may become a part of two different properties for this
purpose. We hold for the petitioner on this point."'
The possibility of combining separate acquisitions "under proper
circumstances," is a collateral reference to regulation 29.23(m)-
1 (i).1 The court here, in effect, subordinates the content of G.C.M.
22106 and 24094 to that regulation. Thus, the case is noteworthy
from two aspects: (1) a rejection of G.C.M. 22106 and (2) the
recognition that under the 1939 Regulations, a taxpayer could treat
two separate properties as one. The second point is discussed infra."
In Amherst Coal Company,3 five "interests" in "the property"
were involved. Underlying the land subject to the five interests were
three separate seams of coal. The first interest consisted of two tracts
of land owned by the taxpayer in fee and acquired in two separate
acquisitions. The second interest consisted of five tracts which were
acquired in one transaction. The third consisted of five tracts ac-
quired as a unit. Each of the fourth and fifth interests was a single
tract separately acquired. The Commissioner contended that seven-
teen different properties existed, on the basis that each acquisition
of an interest in each seam of coal in the lands acquired constituted
a property."
The taxpayer contended that it had but one property within the
meaning of the code. The court, citing the Black Mountain decision,
upheld the taxpayer's contention, relying upon the fact that opera-
tions were conducted on all properties as a unit and that all lands
were contained within a single boundary."5
In Sneed v. Commissioner,"8 the taxpayer owned a tract of
eighty thousand acres. He leased this land in many separate par-
cels to different lessees. The Commissioner "restored to income""'
205 T.C. at 1121.
,' Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-1(i) (1943); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-1(i) (1953).
Treasury Regulations 118 re-enacted this section of Regulations 111 without change.
" See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
2311 T.C. 209 (1948), nonacq., 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
24 This case demonstrates the Commissioner's attempt at a literal application of G.C.M.
24094 and the court's rejection of all three factors described in that memorandum.
" The "single boundary" to which the court referred was a natural boundary.
2 119 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 121 F.2d 725, cert. denied sub nom.,
Thompson v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 686 (1941).
27 When a bonus is received in consideration for the execution of a lease, depletion is
allowed on the bonus in the year it is received, and the basis of the property is reduced
accordingly. If the lease is allowed to expire without production, the depletion allowed or
allowable must be restored to taxable income in the year the lease expires, and the basis
is restored to its previous amount. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 612; Proposed Treas. Reg.
5 1.614-3(a)(2), 21 Fed. Reg. 8452; Treas. Reg. 111, 29.23(m)-10(b) (1943).
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depletion allowances on certain bonuses received by the taxpayer
on certain of the leases which failed to produce. The entire area ex-
cept for the leases in question, which covered approximately five
thousand acres, had produced oil and gas. Since there can be no
restoration to income of depletion taken on bonus payments if there
is any production from the property,"6 the taxpayer contended he
had but one property and, therefore, was not required to restore any
of the depletion to income. The court, however, held that by leasing
the land in separate parcels to many different persons, he separated
it into as many different properties as there were leases made.
In Vinton Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,2' the court held that
a taxpayer who produced oil from eight "different but neighbor-
ing" tracts, acquired at different times in various manners, must
treat each lease as a separate property.
The inconsistency between the Vinton and Sneed cases and the
decisions in Amherst and Black Mountain indicates the hesitancy of
the courts to apply strictly the concept of G.C.M. 22106 and G.C.M.
24094, and the cases are difficult to reconcile if we concern our-
selves solely with the courts' theories of "separate tract or parcels," and
"separate interest." However, when it is recognized that different reg-
ulatory provisions were in effect at the time of the Amherst and Black
Mountain decisions, the cases are easily distinguished." In both Am-
herst and Black Mountain, the taxpayers argued alternatively that
(1) there was but one property or (2) if the properties were held to
be separate, then under the current Regulations they could consider
them as one property where the treatment was consistent.
No case has been found defining the third factor, viz., "each min-
eral deposit." The Regulations under the 1939 Code "defined" a
mineral deposit quite inadequately in this fashion: " (c) The term
'mineral deposit' refers to minerals in place. The cost of a mineral
deposit is that proportion of the total cost of the mineral property
which the value of the deposit bears to the value of the property at
the time of its purchase." 1 This formula for computing cost implies
that each horizon or reservoir should be regarded as a separate min-
eral deposit, hence as a separate property. This theory is essentially
that urged by the Commissioner in the Sneed case."
28 Ibid.
2971 F.2d 420 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 601 (1934).
20Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-1 (i) (1943); See Aikman, Depletable Properties and
Aggregation, Southwestern Legal Foundation Eighth Annual Inst. on Oil and Gas L. & Tax.
511, 533 (1957).
"
1 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-1(c) (1943).
2 See Sneed v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 121
F.2d 725, cert. denied sub. nom., Thompson v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 686 (1941).
[Vol. 13
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Any attempt to classify the cases according to the three factors
listed in G.C.M. 24094 and 22106 inevitably leads to confusion. One
authority, in an article written before the 1954 Code was enacted,
argues persuasively that the definition of "the property" can be ex-
pected to vary according to the purpose for which the definition is
sought.3 With references limited exclusively to the regulations under
the 1939 Code, the author argues that the definition of property is
controlled by section 29.23 (M)-I (i),34 which, due to congressional
re-enactment without change, has the force and effect of law.3" That
section provides:
"The Property," as used in section 114(b) (2),(3), and (4), and
sections 29.23(m)-1 to 29.23(m)-19, inclusive, means the interest
owned by the taxpayer in any mineral property. The taxpayer's interest
in each separate mineral property is a separate "property"; but, where
two or more mineral properties are included in a single tract or parcel
of land, the taxpayer's interest in such mineral properties may be con-
sidered to be a single "property," provided such treatment is consis-
tently followed.
Thus, property is defined in terms of a "mineral property." Mineral
property is defined in section 29.23 (m)-1 (b) " as: " . . . the min-
eral deposit, the development and plant necessary for its extraction,
and so much of the surface of the land only as is necessary for pur-
poses of mineral extraction." In subsection (c), "mineral deposit"
is held to refer " . . . to minerals in place." Mr. Borden contends that
since the code reference in section 29.23(m)-1(i) is to section
114(b) (2), (3), and (4), this definition of property pertains only
to the definition for purposes of discovery and percentage depletion.
From this thesis, the author argues that the "mineral deposit" is de-
terminative of "the property" for purposes of determining percent-
age depletion and that "tract or parcel of land" is determinative of
"the property" for determining gain or loss, abandonment losses,
and other non-depletion computations." As a corollary, therefore,
"the boundaries of the parcel, lease or tract are matters of considera-
tion only in connection with cases where the taxpayer elects to con-
solidate two or more mineral properties within a single parcel, lease
or tract into one percentage depletable property."3 From the stand-
" Borden, A Survey of "The Property" as Referred to in Section 114(b) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 8 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 15 (1953).
4 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-I(i) (1943).
" 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, 55 3.20, 3.22.
"'Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23 (m)-l (b) (1943).
3




point of literal construction, Mr. Borden's thesis is virtually unas-
sailable. Moreover, dictum in the Black Mountain case supports his
position by rejecting an Internal Revenue Service contention that
the property unit is the same for all tax purposes." The possibilities
of an application of this theory under the 1958 act are analyzed
infra."
Thus, under the 1939 Code, there simply is no satisfactory defini-
tion of property, statutory or otherwise. Some light is cast upon the
problem, however, by a consideration of the relationship between the
definition of property and aggregation under the 1939 Code.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
AND AGGREGATION UNDER THE 1939 CODE
Besides the factors of "separate interest," "separate tract or parcel
of land," and "mineral deposit," the courts were concerned with the
units in which mining companies conducted their operations. In
Commissioner v. Gifford-Hill E Co.," the corporation was en-
gaged in sand and gravel mining operations in three areas of Texas
and Louisiana. The lands and minerals were acquired at different
times, were of different character, and were not, in all cases, con-
tiguous. The Commissioner insisted that each separate tract or parcel
of land must be considered a separate property. The court went into
some detail concerning the economics of the mining industry and
the necessity in that industry for unitization of operations. An ex-
cerpt from the opinion indicates the policy behind the decision.
Due to the fact that extensive and expensive equipment are essential
to the taking out and development of the mineral deposit, and to the
fact that the deposits were shown in the present case not to be coter-
minous with the boundaries of any single tract of land, and to the
fact that there would in prudent operation, never be a development
of a sand and gravel deposit so small as to be unprofitable, we con-
clude that the Tax Court correctly held that the regulation was con-
trary to statute and that the term "mineral property" should not be
applied in the taxpayer's mining operation to each single tract of land,
but to the development of the operation as a whole."
The Gifford-Hill definition of "the property" results, of course,
in an informal aggregation, although there is no provision for ag-
gregation per se in the 1939 Code. Thus, the whole procedure re-
315 T.C. at 1120.
40 See parts IV and VI of this Comment.
4111 T.C. 802, aff'd, 180 F.2d 65s (5th Cir. 1950).421d. at 658.
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garding aggregation under the 1939 Code was quite informal. It
should be noted that section 29.23(m)-1(i) was not in effect
at the time of the Vinton and Sneed cases," but it was in effect at
the time of the Amherst and Black Mountain cases, thus permitting
an informal aggregation of mineral properties within a single tract
or parcel of land, and resolving the conflict between those decisions.
While the courts were rejecting the philosophy behind G.C.M.
24904, field agents were also disregarding the strict interpretation
of it when tax consequences were minor." As a practical matter,
local revenue offices "knew" which properties the oil companies in
their jurisdictions had "aggregated" and acquiesced unofficially as
long as the treatment was followed consistently. But the "official"
Revenue Service policy of adhering strictly to the mechanical defi-
nition of "property" gave rise to the possibility of extended litiga-
tion. The mining industry, desiring more definite treatment, made
a proposal to Congress" which would provide treatment consistent
with their operating practices. Congress, in the 1954 enactment, in
section 614, defined "the property" as it was defined in G.C.M.
24094, but subsection (b) furnished an election to aggregate those
properties.
IV. AGGREGATION UNDER THE 1954 CODE
Subsection (a) of section 614 defines "the property" in the small-
est conceivable unit. Assuming for the sake of argument that this
definition overruled contrary case law under the 1939 Code " and
abolished the informal practice thereunder, we may consider the
aggregation provisions of subsection (b).
Section 614(b) introduced several new concepts into the Code.
The first of these is the distinction between an "operating" and
"non-operating" mineral interest.47 As mentioned earlier, the term
"mineral interest" is synonymous with "the property." An "operat-
ing" mineral interest is defined by the Code itself to include:
• . . only an interest in respect of which the costs of production
of the mineral are required to be taken into account by the taxpayer
43 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
"See Amherst Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 209, 221 (1948), nonacq., 1949-1
Cum. Bull. 5.
" Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the General Revision
of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d. Cong., 1st. Sess., topic 38, pt. 1, at 1985 (1954).
"See Aikman, supra note 30, at 519-20; cf. Breeding and Burton, Taxation of Oil
and Gas Income 198 (1954).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b), (c) (2). The term "mineral interest" must be
considered as synonymous with "The Property." S. Fin. Comm. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 80 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1958).
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for purposes of computing the 5 0 per cent limitation provided for in
section 613, or would be so required if the mine, well, or other natural
deposit were in the production state.4"
The regulations provide:
...The term [operating mineral interests] does not include royalty
interests or similar interests, such as production payments or net profits
interests. "Costs of production" for this purpose do not include in-
tangible drilling and development costs, exploration expenditures under
section 615, or development expenditures under section 616 .... A tax-
payer may not aggregate operating mineral interests and non-oper-
ating mineral interests such as royalty interests. 4
After thus defining an "operating mineral interest," the regulations
expressly prohibit aggregation of such an interest with "non-operat-
ing" interests, but allow aggregation by non-operating interests with
other "non-operating" interests upon a showing of undue hardship
and the securing of approval by the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate."0
Another concept, that of the "operating unit," was added by the
1954 Code:
The term "operating unit" refers to operating mineral interests op-
erated together for the purpose of producing minerals. The presence of
the following factors indicates that mineral interests are operated as
a unit:
(1) Common field or operating personnel.
(2) Common supply and maintenance facilities.
(3) Common processing or treatment plants.
(4) Common storage facilities. 1
The 1954 statute was far from satisfactory to either the oil and
gas or the hard-mining industry, since there was no provision for
dividing a single tract into separate properties. Furthermore, only
one aggregation of interests within an operating unit was allowed,"2
and the election to aggregate had to be made in the first year in
which exploration expenditures were incurred, which precluded in-
telligent planning." The proposed regulations further confused the
issue with respect to the "operating unit" in section 1.614-2 (c) by
restricting the unit to an area in which there were actual operations:
"While a taxpayer may operate an operating mineral interest through
4Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b), (e).
" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b); 21 Fed. Reg. 8453.
"°Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c); 21 Fed. Reg. 8453.
"Ibid.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (1) (B).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(b) (2).
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an agent, a co-owner may only aggregate his operating mineral in-
terests that are actually operated as a unit.""' By this proviso, confu-
sion was injected into virtually every case involving the co-owner-
ship of mineral interests and the splitting of authority for actual
operations. The Tax Division of the Southwestern Legal Foundation
recommended that the pertinent sentences of regulation 1.614-2 (c)
be stricken, on the grounds of general impracticability and probable
conflict with the Senate Finance Committee Report on that section
of the Code."
Still another difficulty with the 1954 Code was the import of one
section of the Proposed Regulations:
Each separate mineral interest which in accordance with paragraph
(a) of this section is a separate property shall be so treated, notwith-
standing the fact that the taxpayer under § 29.23 (m)-1(i) of Regu-
lations 118 . . . and corresponding provisions of prior regulations may
have treated more than one of such interests as a "single property."
The basis of each such separate property must be established by a
reasonable method. See however sections 614(b) and (c) and §§
1.614-2 and 1.614-3 for special rules relating to the election to ag-
gregate separate mineral interests."
This regulation could be interpreted to mean that all previous ag-
gregations under the 1939 Code were invalid. Many taxpayers who
had aggregated properties informally under the 1939 Code probably
failed to make formal elections to aggregate those properties under
the 1954 Code, and probably would be precluded from aggregating
anew by the time limit.' Further, adjusting the bases of the proper-
ties would be an immense task in view of the depletion claimed dur-
ing the informal aggregation."
The above problems represent only a few of those facing the ex-
tractive industries under the 1954 Code. Since the 1954 Code cre-
ated more problems than it solved, the hard-mining industry again
appealed to Congress, and section 37 of the Technical Amendments
Act, as it relates to minerals other than oil or gas, admirably reflects
their work. A discussion of these provisions is, of course, beyond the
scope of this Comment."
44Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(c), 21 Fed. Reg. 8453.
"By letter in Summer of 1957, Comment on Proposed Income Tax Regulations, Tax
Division, Southwestern Legal Foundation, on file in Faculty Law Library, Southern Metho-
dist University School of Law.
a"Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 8453.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 614(b) (2); Proposed Treas. Reg. S 1.614-2(d), 21 Fed.
Reg. 8453.
" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 8453.
"For a discussion of the effect of the 1958 Act upon the hard mining industry, see
Schoenbaum, Mineral "Property" As Defined by Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
8 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 13 (1958).
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V. AGGREGATION UNDER THE TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1958
The Technical Amendments Act contains no new procedure eo
nomine for the aggregation of oil and gas properties, but it does pro-
vide (in extremely ambiguous fashion) what is apparently an elec-
tion for the taxpayer to define "the property" under the 1939 Code
and its pertinent regulations and the case law thereunder. For clarity,
it must be reiterated that the 1939 Code did not contain a specific
provision for aggregation, but that an aggregation resulted when
"the property" was "defined" by a judicial decision, or by the ap-
plication of the regulations.
Is the oil and gas operator in any better position by virtue of the
1958 amendment than he was under the original 1954 Code provi-
sions? A literal reading of the statute indicates that the operator may
ignore the requirements and restrictions of subsections (a) and (b)
of section 614 for the purpose of "aggregation" under the 1939
Code. But if the resultant depletable unit would have been an ag-
gregation under subsection (b), the provisions of that subsection
will be applied to his other property.
Two separate operations are thus involved when proceeding under
the new act. First, "property" is "defined" (aggregated under the
1939 Code). Secondly, after this informal aggregation is accom-
plished, subsection (b) is applied to other property of the taxpayer
if the informal aggregation would have been a valid aggregation
under subsection (b). The restriction of aggregations to properties
within an operating unit which, as previously discussed," was
a major disadvantage to the taxpayer under the 1954 Code, is found
in subsection (b). Although this restriction is not found in the pre-
sent subsection (d), it may in effect be placed there through the
secondary application of subsection (b). Since the only application
of subsection (b) is after aggregation, it is arguable that properties
aggregated under the 1958 Act need not be within a single operating
unit! To carry this reasoning one step further, since such an aggre-
gation, i.e., of properties not within an operating unit, would be in-
valid under subsection (b), subsection (b) would not be applied to
his other interests.
The courts, however, probably would be reluctant to "define" the
properties into an aggregation unless those properties were substan-
tially within an operating unit."1 Further, the intent of Congress in
60 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.




continuing the effect of subsection (b) is easily construed as an in-
tent to restrain aggregations to those within an operating unit, even
though the pertinent section is mentioned secondarily. Nevertheless,
the strict requirements of section 1.614 defining the "operating unit"
may now be impliedly overruled.
Procedure under the new subsection (d) can be shown best by
example. (We assume that the nebulous restriction of aggregations
to those within an operating unit is still in effect.) Assume three
leases operated as a unit on a single tract or parcel of land. The tax-
payer can "elect" to "aggregate" two of these leases under the 1939
regulations. Since such an aggregation would be an aggregation under
subsection (b) of the 1954 Code, that subsection is applied to the
third lease, which therefore must be considered as a separate proper-
ty. Further, no second aggregation will be allowed within the op-
erating unit. Similarly, the taxpayer may, the writer believes, rely
on the case law prior to 1954 instead of the 1939 Regulations. If
he does so, he may, for example, choose the Cree"2 case as precedent,
since that decision would allow an aggregation of interests "inher-
ently the same in character" by merger. If this would result in an
aggregation under subsection (b), that subsection is likewise ap-
plicable to his other property. But what if the decision relied on
would constitute an aggregation of interests not within a single op-
erating unit-would this aggregation be valid? The writer believes
that it would be invalid because he is convinced that the 1958
amendments in effect engraft upon the pre-1954 Code decisions the
requirement that the properties to be aggregated be within an oper-
ating unit. In addition, the act does away with the narrow definition
of property under section 614 (a) and gives impetus to decisions
such as Cree, Amherst, and Berkshire, and the courts should there-
fore ignore the relevant G.C.M.'s under the 1939 Code.
In the event that Mr. Borden's strong argument"3 finds support in
the courts, it is believed that while mineral deposits would be determ-
inative of the depletable unit, in order to aggregate two or more of
these units, they would have to be within a single operating unit.
A quite recent Tax Court decision may be valuable as authority
in a future controversy concerning subsection (d). In Island Creek
Coal Co. v. Commissioner,4 the company's mineral interests con-
sisted of two leasehold estates and other freehold estates. Its two
mines were located within one tract of land. Of the estates owned
62 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
63 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
64 30 T.C. 370 (1958).
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in the seams of coal located under the land, some were fee estates
and others were leasehold. In its returns from 1932 to 1941, the com-
pany treated all its property as a single property. Later, the com-
pany divided the single interest into three "separate economic in-
terests," and computed percentage depletion on that basis. Depletion
allowance for 1939 was reduced; the other years were unaffected.
In 1943 and 1944, the company computed depletion on the former
single-property basis. The company attached schedules indicating
that the company elected to compute depletion on a single-property
basis. Schedules were also attached showing what the depletion would
have been on a "separate economic interest" basis. In 1945, 1946, and
1947, the company reverted to the "separate economic interest" basis,
and the amounts claimed were less than would have been allowed un-
der a single-property basis. In 1948, 1949, and 1950, the amounts de-
termined under both methods were the same. In 1951, the company
used the single-property basis. The Commissioner determined a de-
ficiency for the year 1951 based on the difference between the claim-
ed depletion and that which would have resulted from a "separate
economic interest" basis. The principal issue was the consistency of
the taxpayer's treatment of its basis. The court indicated that a
single-property computation (i.e., an aggregation) was allowed when
three factors were present: (1) ownership of interest in properties;
(2) location of properties within a single tract or parcel of land;
and (3) consistent treatment of income from properties as arising
from a single property.
These requirements are substantially those of Regulations 111,
§ 29.23 (m)-I (i). It is believed that the court would have added the
requirement that the interests be within an operating unit if this
case had originated under the 1958 act.
It should be noted that the newly enacted subsection (d) applies
only to operating mineral interests. "Non-operating" interests, with
but two exceptions, are still governed by the 1954 Code provisions.
The requirement in the 1954 Code that "undue hardship"" be shown
in order to aggregate non-operating interests has been deleted from
the statute in deference to the new requirement that the taxpayer
show that the aggregation does not have as its sole purpose the avoid-
ance of tax." Also, non-operating interests in adjacent tracts may
now be aggregated even though they are not contiguous."
"Ilnt. Rev. Code of 1954, S 614(b), and (e) as adopted by Technical Amendments
Act of 1958.6Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 614(c).




The above paragraphs relating to the aggregation of operating
mineral interests under the 1958 Act are predicated upon a literal
reading of the statute. Upon reading the Senate Report' on the sec-
tion, however, one gets the impression that an election "de novo" was
not intended. In the case of a taxpayer who filed returns under the
1939 Code, the Senate Report states that if that taxpayer proceeds
under subsection (d), he must now treat the properties as he had
elected under the 1939 Code. Thus, there is apparently no election
to make a de novo aggregation as to properties on which depletion
was taken under the 1939 Code despite the wording of the statute!
But what of a taxpayer who has acquired his property since 1953?
Is the statute then to be interpreted for one class of taxpayer differ-
ently than for another? The question is unresolved by the Senate
Report and must await publication of the Proposed Regulations.
Another difficulty with the new statute is that if a taxpayer elects
to proceed under the 1939 rules, he must reallocate the adjusted basis
of the properties accordingly."0 This is not required of the mining
taxpayer under the new amendments pertaining to the hard-mining
industry."
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1958 Technical Amendments Act is of little benefit to the
oil and gas operator. If aggregations made under the 1939 Code have
become disadvantageous, presumably he is bound by those elections.'
In the case of a taxpayer who acquired property after 1953, if an
election is permitted,"3 difficult adjustments to basis are required. The
troublesome and ambiguous requirements that aggregations must be
of properties within an operating unit, and that only one aggrega-
tion may be made within that unit, are still in effect, engrafted upon
the relatively favorable pre-1954 Code decisions.
The genesis of the entire problem can be traced to the inadequate
69S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1958). The pertinent section reads as
follows: "If the taxpayer desires to treat any such property in accordance with the rules
applicable under the 1939 Code, there is no provision in S 614(d) with respect to any
taxable year subject to the 1954 Code which will permit the taxpayer to treat such prop-
erty in a manner inconsistent with the manner in which it was treated under the 1939
Code. Therefore, if a taxpayer's treatment of any property or properties for taxable years
to which the 1939 Code was applicable would have been binding upon him for all future
years but for the enactment of section 614(a) and (b) of the 1954 Code, his application
of the rule in section 614(d) permitting him to treat. such property or properties as though
section 614(a) and (b) had never been enacted has the effect of continuing the effect of
his 1939 Code treatment, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1953, and ending
after August 16, 1954, insofar as those properties are concerned." (Emphasis added.)
70S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 185, 186 (1958).
71 Ibid.
"* Assuming no change of taxpayer entity is involved.
73 See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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and illogical definition of "the property" contained in the early
G.C.M.'s and in the 1954 Code. The writer believes that a definition
along the following lines would be consistent with operating prac-
tices, and without prejudice to the collection of revenue.
(a) "The property" is defined as each separate economic interest of a
taxpayer in minerals in place."4
(b) Such properties of a like nature may be deemed to merge without
the necessity of a formal election to aggregate those interests by the
taxpayer, as long as the extraction of the minerals in which the eco-
nomic interests are owned is conducted within one operating unit.
(c) An "operating unit" is defined as that unit within which a reason-
able and prudent operator would carry out the drilling, lifting, and
preliminary storage operations prior to the transportation of the min-
erals for processing or marketing.
(d) "Non-operating mineral interests" as defined in the 1954 Code
may be merged or aggregated with other "non-operating mineral in-
terests" upon formal application of the taxpayer to aggregate or merge
those interests and approval by the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate. In no event shall "operating" mineral interests be aggregated
with "non-operating" mineral interests, and in no event shall there be
more than one aggregation of "non-operating" interests within the
same operating unit.
This definition would allow any number of aggregations of similar
economic interests within an operating unit if those interests are of
an "operating" nature. The question of what constitutes an "operat-
ing unit" becomes a fact issue (as it is, in reality, under the present
regulations).
While this proposed definition certainly would not settle all of the
problems of the present law, it would reduce the number of issues
in an aggregation problem so that the questions could be solved by
the application of familiar concepts.
The 1958 Act results literally in confusion, twice confounded. Al-
though aggregation today is considered a minor problem, being re-
legated to a secondary position behind percentage depletion and the
election to expense intangibles, it may conceivably become very im-
portant in the event legislation is passed reducing the present per-
centage depletion allowed to the oil and gas industry. It would there-
fore be to the interest of that industry to attempt immediately to ob-
tain an adequate definition of property in the Internal Revenue Code. 5
Donald F. Padgett
4 As defined in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
" For an extended treatment of other problems relating to the definition of "The
Property" and Aggregation, see French, Oil and Gas Property and Aggregation, 36 Texas
L. Rev. 745 (1958); Fiske, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Transactions, §§ 4.01, 4.07(1958).
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